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Summary findings
Mingat  and Tan explore  differences  in education  in rich  their  education  systems.  But bigger budget  allocations  to
and poor  countries  by first systematically  documenting  education  contribute  relatively little  to differences  in
the relationship  between  per  capita GNP  and various  resources.
indicators  of educational  development.  They  then  exploit  Lighter  demographic  burdens  in richer  countries  is also
a simple accounting  identity  relating  the availability  of  a relatively  modest factor.
resources to their  expenditure,  to clarify the sources  of  By far the most  important  factor is the decline of
rich countries'  advantage  in education.  teacher salaries relative  to per capita  GNP, which
Data for  a sample  of 125 countries  in 1993  confirm  accounts for at least half of any educational  advantage  at
the expected  favorable relationship  bet-ween per  capita  all stages of economic  development.
GNP and each of the following  dimensions  of  The extra  resources for  education  associated with
educational  development:  income  growth  allows a country  to expand  enrollments
*  The sector  context  (as reflected  by the demographic  and improve  classroom  conditions  by reducing  the pupil-
burden  on the education  system, the government's  fiscal  teacher  ratio.  Early in income  growth,  countries  allocate
capacity,  and so on).  more  of the extra resources  to expand  coverage;  later
*  The production  of education  services, including  they  shift toward  reducing  the pupil-teacher  ratio.
such factors  as public spending  on education  and the  But,  contend  the authors,  so long as coverage is not yet
composition  of spending.  universal  a more  efficient strategy for educational
- Education  outcomes,  in terms of coverage  and  development  is to emphasize  continued  expansion  of
student  learning.  coverage rather than a rapid reduction  in the pupil-
*  Efficiency of sector  operations.  teacher ratio.  In the long run,  lower  levels of educational
- Equity in access and distribution  of public spending  attainment  among  tomorrow's  adults  is likely to diminish
on education.  learning  achievement  among  tomorrow's  children.
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A staple feature of cross-country comparisons is that poor countries typically lag
behind rich countries on almost any indicators of educational development. What in fact is the
relation  between  country wealth  and  education?  What  underlying  factors  account for  rich
countries' advantage in education?  How does the impact of these factors change in the course of
economic growth?  What scope is there for policy choice to improve education sector outcomes?
We explore these questions by first documenting the relation between per capita
GNP and various indicators of educational development in a systematic fashion.  We then exploit
a simple accounting identity relating the availability of resources to  the expenditure of those
resources to clarify the sources of rich countries' advantage in education.  Data for our sample of
some 125 countries in 1993 confirm the expected favorable relation between per capita GNP and
each  of  the  following  dimensions  of  educational  development:  (a)  the  sector  context  as
characterized by the demographic burden  on the education  system, the government's  overall
fiscal capacity, and  so on; (b) the production  of education services, including such factors as
public spending on education and the composition of spending; (c) education outcomes in terms
of coverage and student learning; (d) efficiency of sector operations; and (e) equity in access and
distribution of public spending on education.
An appealing explanation of why richer countries  achieve better  results is that
they have more resources to run well-functioning and efficient education systems.  Comparing
pairs  of  countries  at contiguous levels  of per  capita GNP  between  $200 and  $10,000 (e.g.
countries at $200 and $400 would form one pair, and those at $400 and $800, another pair), we
found that indeed the richer country in each pair enjoys an advantage of almost 50 percent in the
resources  available  per  school-aged  child.  Yet  a  closer  look  reveals  that  bigger  budget
allocations to education make a relatively small contribution to the differences in resources.  The
commonly-cited role of lighter demographic burdens  in the richer  countries is also relatively
modest, contributing between 17 and 32 percent of the advantage among the pairs of countries
compared.  By far the most important factor is the decline of teacher salaries relative to the per
capita  GNP, accounting  for  at least  50 percent  of the  advantage  at  all  stages  of  economic
development.
The  extra resources  per  school-aged child  that  materializes  in  the process  of
income  growth allow  countries to  expand enrollments and  improve  classroom conditions by
reducing the pupil-teacher ratio.  At the earliest phase of income growth-corresponding  to a risein the per capita GNP from $200 to $400-countries  allocate more of the extra resources to
support expansion of coverage, but at all subsequent  stages, the emphasis shifts in favor of
reducing  the pupil-teacher  ratio.  In both the 1970s and the 1990s the shift in emphasis  away
from expansion  of coverage  took place in contexts where access to primary education  was still
not yet universal.  Moreover, it occurred at significantly lower enrollment rates-around  50
percent-in  the 1990s  than in the 1970s,  signaling  a stronger  bias against  expansion  of coverage
in the more recent  period.
The revealed priorities in  spending raise important policy questions.  Is an
emphasis on reduction of the pupil-teacher  ratio at the cost of slower progress in expanding
coverage an efficient strategy for the sector?  Two considerations suggest an answer in the
negative:  the first is that over the range that the pupil-teacher  ratio typically  varies in developing
countries,  smaller  pupil-teacher  ratios have little or no impact  on student  learning;  moreover,  the
slower  progress  in expanding  coverage  implies that tomorrow's  adults will be less well-educated
which in turn is likely to diminish student learning among tomorrow's children, given that
adults' educational  attainment  is a strong predictor  of children's school performance. Thus, as
long as coverage  is not yet universal  a more efficient strategy for educational  development  is to
emphasize  continued expansion  of coverage rather than a rapid reduction in the pupil-teacher
ratio.
Aside from the systematic  differences  in education  across  rich and poor countries,
the study also finds evidence  of substantial  diversity  among  countries  at comparable  levels of per
capita GNP.  Countries set different priorities in the allocation of public spending, pursue
different policies that affect how education services are organized and delivered, and make
different  tradeoffs  as to how resources are used to support expansion  of coverage and reduction
in the pupil-teacher  ratio. In countries  where education  is poorly developed,  policy choices  that
affect  the market  for teachers  (and  therefore  their cost),  as well as the balance  between  expansion
of coverage and reduction in  the pupil-teacher ratio have especially strong effects on the
prospects  for progress  in education.The Mechanics of Progress in Education:
Evidence from Cross-Country Data
1. Introduction
In all countries  education  plays  a key role  in social  and economic  life, so it is not
surprising  that most governments  seek,  at least  in rhetoric,  to build  education  systems  that offer
the best possible  services  to as wide a segment  of the population  as possible. Despite  the
common  goal, however,  countries  achieve  very different  results. On almost  any measure  of
schooling  outcome-whether  related to coverage  or student  learning-low-income  countries
typically  lag behind  high-income  countries.  What  are the sources  of rich  countries'  advantage  in
education? What is the role of such factors as demographic  conditions,  government  fiscal
capacity,  prices,  and policy  choice?  Does  the impact  of these  factors  change  as countries  grow
rich,  and  if so,  how? What  do  the patterns  reveal  about  the nature  of  policy  choice  in education?
Answers  to these  questions  are explored  in this paper. In the process  we  hope to
discover  patterns  in the relation  between  country  wealth  and various  aspects  of educational
development,  and to clarify  the mechanics  of progress  in education  as a country  grows  rich.' At
the same time, we also expect  to improve  our understanding  of policy options  to improve
education. Given  the breadth  of these issues,  our study  represents  a partial  treatment,  both
because  it focuses  on system-wide  features  rather  than  on pedagogical  processes  at the classroom
level,  and  because  it relies  solely  on quantitative  data. 2
These  limitations  notwithstanding  the findings  reveal  several  key insights. The
first is that systematic  links exist between  country  wealth  and most indicators  of educational
'For a discussion  of similar  questions  from  the perspective  of a production-demand  framework  based  on data  from 1960  to 1980  see
Schultz,  T.P. 1988  "Expansion  of public school  expenditures  and enrollments:  inter-country  evidence  on the effects  of income,
prices,  and  population  growth,"  Economics  of Education  Review  7(2): 167-83.
2 The bulk  of the data pertains  to 125 countries  around  1993,  the latest  year for which data  on the most of the indicators  used in
our study are currently available  or can be constructed,  supplemented  by data for 1975 for a smaller set of indicators  and
countries. These data come from a larger time-series  database  prepared by the Institute  de Recherche sur l'Economie  de
l'Education  (IREDU), Universite de Bourgogne, Dijon, France.  The raw data come from various sources, including
international  organizations  (e.g. UNESCO,  the World Bank, ILO, and OECD), published and unpublished  country and
comparative  studies,  and doctoral  dissertations.  Data for all the indicators  have  been checked  for consistency  in their relation
to each other, as well as across time.  Where  published  data contain obvious  inconsistencies  they are replaced  by data for a
nearby  year, or by simulations  based on related data.  Since the database  was created, new data have become available,  but
rather  than attempt  to incorporate  them  we have  decided  simply  to use what is already  available  in it.-2 -
development,  including steady easing of demographic  pressures on the education system as
incomes  rise, significant  expansion,  at the primary level of coverage accompanied  by a gradual
rise in per pupil spending,  declines  in the pupil-teacher  ratio and teacher salaries  relative to the
per capita GNP. The relation between  country  wealth and most of the indicators  was relatively
loose, however, suggesting substantial scope for diversity in policy choice across countries.
Exploiting  an accounting  identity  to relate several  indicators  of expenditure  to those on outcomes
in primary education,  we found that as a country grows rich, the resources for education that
become available per school-aged child indeed increase significantly.  Strikingly, the main
source of the increase  is not bigger budget allocations,  nor a lighter demographic  burden,  but the
sharp declines in teacher salaries relative to  the per capita GNP.  Countries use the extra
resources  to expand primary school coverage and reduce the pupil-teacher  ratio, but they have
tended  to emphasize  the latter option,  a pattern that has become more obvious in the 1  990s than
in the 1970s. In light of the weak links between pupil-teacher  ratios and student  learning  in the
context of  developing countries, the  shift in  emphasis raises serious questions about the
underlying  assumptions  of recent policy  choices  in education,  especially  in poor countries.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 documents the relation
between country  wealth and educational  development  in order to identify  systematic  differences
in education  between rich and poor countries.  Section 3 sets out a framework  to clarify the
sources of richer country's advantage  in education, and to examine how countries allocate  the
resources  that materialize  in the process of economic  growth to expand coverage and improve
schooling  conditions. Section  4 discusses  the policy  issues raised by the findings  in the previous
two sections,  particularly  with regard to quantity-quality  tradeoffs  in resource allocation,  and the
role of policy  choice  in shaping  progress  in the sector. Section  5 concludes  the paper.
2. How Is Education Different In Rich And Poor Countries?
We make the comparisons  along five dimensions  of education  that together  paint
a reasonably  comprehensive  picture of how  the sector operates: 3
3.  For lack of space not only selected indicators of the five dimensions are included below. Supplementary graphs and tables are
available upon request from the authors.-3 -
*  Overall sector context, as described by demographic pressures on the education system,
overall  fiscal  capacity  of  the  government,  the  educational  attainment of  the  adult
population, the structure of employment by economic sector, and the share of education
in the public budget;
*  Production of education services as reflected in the public-private  division of service
provision, the composition  of public spending on education by level and expenditure
category, and average public spending per pupil;
*  Education quantity and quality, as measured by various indicators of coverage, and by
student achievement on international mathematics and science tests;
*  Efficiency of the education system, as captured by the pattern of grade-to-grade student
flow, and education outcomes relative to the amount of resources invested to achieve
them; and
- Equity  in  education,  as  revealed  by  gender  disparities  in  enrollments  and  by  the
distribution of public spending on education.
2.1 Overall sector context
The demographic composition  of the population  describes a key feature of the
sector context because children and young people depend on adults to finance the system; thus,
the more children there are relative to  adults, the heavier  is the  fiscal burden that education
places on each adult.  The government's  fiscal capacity-as  reflected by total public spending
relative to  the GNP-also  matters  because  a bigger  overall budget  is  likely  to  improve the
availability  of  resources  for  education,  not  least because  in  most  countries  the  government
provides most of the funds for education.  A third aspect of the sector context is the educational
attainment  of adults, its relevance  stemming  from the fact  that  adults make decisions  about
children's  schooling  and they  also  shape  the broader  out-of-school  learning  environment to
which children are exposed.  Yet a fourth features is the distribution of employment by sector; it
matters  because  it closely mirrors  the  economy's demand  for  educated labor, which  in  turn
affects  the opportunity  cost  of  schooling  and the  employment  prospects  of  school  leavers.
Finally, the intensity of the inter-sector competition for public funds, as reflected in the share of
education in overall public spending, forms yet a fifth dimension of the overall context.  Below
we examine how the foregoing aspects of the sector context relate to country wealth, as proxied
by the per capita GNP.-4-
Demographic  burden  and  overall  fiscal  capacitv.  As  a  measure  of  the
demographic  burden we express  the population  aged  6-11 (corresponding  roughly  to the primary
school aged population)  as a percentage  of the total population 4 Figure 1 (panel A) shows  that
this indicator (which we shall call the dependency  ratio) declines steadily as per capita GNP
rises, from an estimated  average  of 23 percent  in countries  at a per capita  income of $200, down
to only 14 percent, on average, among OECD countries. The difference is large, because it
implies that, all other things being equal, achieving  the same coverage in primary education
implies twice as heavy a resource  burden  (relative  to the GNP) in the poorest countries  as in the
richest  countries.
Figure 1: Relation  between  demographic  constraint  and fiscal  capacity,  and per capita GNP, circa 1993
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The line in the graph, estimated  from regression  analysis, describes  the average
relationship  between the dependency  ratio and per capita GNP (expressed  in logarithmic  units). 5
The B? statistic for the regression  equation is relatively high, at 0.65, suggesting  a fairly tight
relationship  between the two variables. Thus, although  the scatter plot suggests  variation  across
countries in  the  dependency ratio, the  broad pattern is  that countries generally follow a
predictable  path of demographic  transition  as they grow  rich.
4TIhe  pattr  is simila when  the numerator  includes children  in  a binader  age  band  (6-14)  corresponding  to basic  education.
S We estimated  the following  equation:  dependency  ratio =  a  + I5.  In (per capita  GNP).  +  ,u,  where oa  and ,B  are the regression
estimates,  and 1i  is  the exmr  tern. The  value  of  ff is the  change  in the dependency  ratio  associated  with  a percentage  point  change  in
the per capita  GNP. ln thin  formulation,  a change  in  per capita  GNP  from,  say, $200  to $400  (a 100  percent  rise) would  have the
same  impact  as a change  from,  say,  $1,000  to $2,000  (which  is also  a 100  percent  rise).-5-
Turning  now  to  panel  B  in  the  figure,  we  note that  the  overall  size of  the
government budget  as a percentage  of  GDP tends  to  expand with  country wealth-from  an
estimated average of 27 percent among the poorest countries, to 47 percent  among the OECD
countries.  The pattern  is consistent  with  the fact  that  as countries  becomes  richer  and  the
economy  more formalized,  the  tax  base  tends  to  broaden  and  tax  administration  generally
becomes more efficient.  The positive association is relatively weak, however, as the R 2 statistic
of the regression  equation is only  0.25 for the sample as a whole,  and an  even smaller 0.04
among countries with incomes no higher than $4,000 per person. 6 Thus, in this income group,
the size of the public budget relative to the GNP varies almost independently of a country's  level
of economic development, suggesting that the variable is generally open to policy choice.
Adults'  educational  attainment  and  the  economy's  employment  structure.  To
economize  on  space we  examine  only  the  adult  literacy  rate  and  the  share  of  workers  in
agriculture as measures of these aspects of the sector context.7 Data for our sample show that the
literacy rate rises with the per capita GNP, from an estimated 50 percent in countries at $200 in
per capita GNP in  1993, to nearly universal literacy by the time the per capita GNP exceeds
$10,000.  With regard to the structure of employment, the graph shows that the share of workers
in  agriculture drops precipitously  as a  country grows rich,  from  an estimated  average of  71
percent at $200 in per capita GNP, to 35 percent at $1,500, and then to only about 5 percent at
$20,000; correspondingly, employment in industry and services expands as country wealth rises.
Both  the literacy rate and the employment  share of agriculture relate fairly tightly  to the per
capita GNP, with a R 2 statistic of 0.54 and 0.77 respectively; the result implies that countries
face relatively similar constraints in these aspects of the context for educational development.
Inter-sector competition for  public spending.  The more intense the competition
for resources, the smaller is likely to  be the share of education in the public budget.  Do rich
countries tend to favor education over other sectors more than poorer countries?  The evidence
suggests  no  such tendency:  rich  countries  allocate  about  the  same  share  as poor  countries,
6 The  regression  equation  is the same  as that in the  previous  footnote,  except  that it contains  an extra  terms,  the square  of hn  (per  capita
GNP). The  new item is added  to improve  the fit of the regression  to the data,  which improves  a higher  R 2 value. Subsequent
regressions  use one of these  functional  forms,  and  the choice  is decided  based on the  R2value  of the regression.
7 For details  on other  indicators  see Mingat  Alain and Jee-Peng  Tan (1998)  "Education  in rich and poor countries:  a systematic
comparison"  mimeo,  Human  Development  Department,  The  World  Bank.-6-
ranging between 13 and 17 percent of the total public budget.  However, as a share of the GNP,
public  spending  on  education rises  more  noticeably  with  per  capita  GNP,  mainly  because
countries' overall fiscal capacity expands with country wealth.  Both measures of the availability
of resources for education show a fairly weak relation to the per capita GNP, with a R2 statistic
of  0.08  and  0.22 respectively.  The  results  confirm  the expectation  that  countries  do  have
considerable leeway in deciding how much to spend on education.
2.2 Production of education services
Consider below the following aspects of the production of education services: the
public-private provision in education; the distribution of public spending on education; and the
level and pattern of public spending per pupil.
Public-private  roles in service provision.  The available  data relate only to the
share of enrollments in public and private schools at the primary and secondary levels.  Because
private  schools often receive public  subsidies and public  schools sometimes charge  fees, the
public-private  distinction  does  not  correspond  to  a  clear-cut  separation  in  financing
arrangements.  The division is more reasonably interpreted as reflecting different arrangements
for school management.  Over the per capita income range in our data, private schools account
for between 10 and 13 percent of all children at the primary level, and between 13 and 18 percent
of those  at the  secondary  level.  At  both  levels, the  share  of  private  sector enrollments  is
8 unrelated to the per capita GNP, a pattern consistent with the findings in James (1993).  The role
of private education thus reflects the influence of factors other than country wealth, including
that of policy choices, that affect the incentives for private sector participation in education.
The  distribution  of  public  spending  on  education.  Given  the  government's
predominant role in education, we examine in more detail the allocation of spending by level and
across pedagogical and  non-pedagogical inputs.  Table  1 shows simulations of the sub-sector
shares of spending based on regression estimates of the relation between the shares and country
wealth.  In general, the share of primary education decline as countries grow rich, while those of
James, Estelle. 1993. "Why do different countries choose a different public-private mix of educational services? "Journal of Human
Resources. 28(3): 571-592. James found that religion and language exert a particularly  strong influence on the share of private
enrollments.  In addition, the share is affected positively by the fact that the government subsidizes private education, and
negatively by the magnitude of public spending on education.-7 -
secondary and  higher education  rise.  The trends  are relatively  flat,  however: the  share  of
primary education, for example, falls only from 45 percent to 31 percent as per capita GNP rises
a hundred-fold from $200 to $20,000.  Moreover, there is wide variation across countries in the
distribution of spending, as indicated by the small R2  statistic for all the regressions (last two
columns in the table).  The result implies that countries have substantial leeway to set priorities
for spending across levels of the education.
Table 1: Simulations  of the sub-sector  share  of public  spending  on education  at selected  per
capita GNP, circa 1993 (%) al
Per capita GNP, 1993 $
Sub-sector
200  400  800  1,500  3,000  10,000  20,000  (1)  (2)
Primary  45.1  43.0  40.8  38.9  36.8  33.1  31.0  0.21  0.02
Secondary  25.8  26.8  27.8  28.7  29.7  31.5  32.5  0.06  0.03
Higher  17.1  17.7  18.4  19.0  19.6  20.7  21.4  0.05  0.05
a! Excludes  data  for countries  where primary  and secondary  are combined  as basic  education.
Note:  The R2corresponds,  in column  (1), to a regression  of the form  noted in footnote  5, based  on data  for the whole  sample;
and in column  (2),  to the same  regression  based on data  for countries  with  a per capita  income  below  $4,000  in 1993.
Consider now the allocation of spending by expenditure category.  The available
data  pertain to  spending  on  financial  aid  for  students  (in  the  form  of  grants,  scholarships,
bursaries and welfare services); and on pedagogical materials.  Figure 2 (panel A) shows that the
share of financial aid in total  spending on education follows a U-shape, falling from about 10
percent in countries at $200 in per  capita GNP, to about 5 percent  among countries at $3,000,
and then rising to  about 8 percent  among countries at $20,000.  The U-shape is even more
pronounced if we exclude the data for primary education where hardly any spending is used to
provide student financial aid.  The relation between the share claimed by student aid and the per
capita GNP is relatively loose, however, with a R2 statistic of only 0.06.9 It means that country
wealth have little influence on the pattern of allocation.
With regard to spending on textbooks and pedagogical materials, we focus on the
pattern at the primary and secondary levels where these inputs are a key determinant of student
achievement.  The figure (panel B) shows that as countries grow richer this category claims an
9 The  R2  statistic  for  separate  regressions  on secondary  and  higher  education  is,  respectively,  0.23  and 0.38.-8-
achievement. The figure (panel  B) shows  that as countries  grow richer this category claims an
increasing  share of public  spending  on primary  and secondary  education,  rising from less than 2
percent among the poorest countries, to more 8 percent among the richest countries. 1 0 The
relationship  between spending share and per capita GNP is moderately  loose, the R2 statistic
being 0.27 for the whole sample. It suggests  that countries  have some  leeway  in setting  the level
of spending  on pedagogical  materials,  although  poverty  does constrain  its range.
Figure  2: Relation  between  shares  of public  spending  on student  aid and pedagogical  materials,  and
the per capita  GNP,  circa 1993
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Per pupil public spending on education. We consider first the relation between
country wealth and spending  per pupil (expressed  as a percentage  of the per capita GNP), and
then turn to  examine its relation to two underlying  components  of unit spending-the  pupil-
teacher  ratio and teacher  salaries."
Figure 3 pertains to spending  per student  at the primary and tertiary levels; the
pattern for secondary  education, excluded  to save space, is intermediate  between that for the
other two levels.  In primary education, average spending per pupil among countries with
'° Because  rich  countries'  total  spending  on  pruiaiy and secondary  education  as a share  of GNP  also  tends  to be bigger,  the gap in real
spending  on pedagogical  mateials between  rich  and poor  countries  is in fact  wider  than suggested  by the difference  in the shares  of
speding.
The two indicators  refer to averages  for the sector  as a whole. Thus,  a low level of unit spending  may reflect low aggregate
spending  or large shares of enrollment  in unsubsidized  private  education. For the pupil-teacher  ratio, both  the numerator  and
denominator  refer to totals in public and private schools. These definitions  are appropriate  mainly for comparisons  of
aggregate  patterns  across  sub-sectors  and countries.-9-
incomes  between $200 and $3,000  is more  or less flat at around  0.12 to 0.14  times the per capita
GNP. It then rises as incomes  increase  beyond $3,000,  reaching  about 0.2 times the per capita
GNP among  the OECD  countries.
Figure 3: Relation  between  per-pupil  public  spending  on education  and per capita  GNP,  circa 1993
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In higher education,  the relation  between  the two variables  follows the shape of a
rectangular  hyperbola:  per student spending  is highest  among the poorest countries, averaging
more than 4 times the per capita  income for those at $200 in income,  and flattening  out at about
0.6 times the per capita income at $10,000 and beyond. In terms of the tightness of the relation
between public spending  per student  and per capita GNP,  the regression  R 2 statistic ranges from
0.14 for primary  education,  to 0.38 for higher  education,  both values being smaller when the data
are restricted  to countries  below $3,000 in per capita GNP.  Thus, while there is a predictable
pattern  of per pupil  spending  and country  wealth,  the relation  is loose, implying  that countries  do
make quite different  choices  in education  finance.
Per pupil spending  can be decomposed  into two underlying  components:  the pupil-
teacher  ratio  and average  teacher  salaries. At the primary  level  where  teachers  typically  account  for
the bulk of all spending,  per pupil spending  is approximately  equal to average teacher salaries
divided  by the pupil-teacher  ratio. Figure 4 shows  how the two variables  relate to the per capita
GNP.  The decline in pupil-teacher  ratio as incomes  rise is familiar  from causal observation  of
schooling  conditions  in rich and poor countries,  but the decline  in teacher salaries  is perhaps  less
familiar. The pattern stems  directly  from  the fact  that  as countries  develop,  educated  labor  becomes- 10-
more  plentiful,  and the earnings  of teachers  therefore  generally  rise less  rapidly  than the per capita
GNP. The behavior  of the two variables  taken  together  is consistent  with the basic economic  logic
that  when an input is costly,  it tends  to be used  more  sparingly  than  when  it is less  costly.
Figure  4: Relation  between  the pupil-teacher  ratio  and teacher  salaries  at the primary  level and per
capita  GNP,  circa 1993
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For both the pupil-teacher  ratio and teacher salaries,  the relation  to the per capita
GNP over  the entire  income  range in our data is moderately  tight, as indicated  by R. 2 values of 0.45
and 0.31 respectively;  among lower income countries,  however,  the corresponding  values are
smaller, at 0.28 and 0.23.  The results suggest that countries at the same level of economic
development  make appreciably  different  choices  in how  they  organize  teaching  and learning. Given
the scope for choice, the issue clearly  is to discover  options  that produce  the biggest impact  on
schooling  outcomes.
At the  secondary and tertiary levels, data for a  sufficiently large number of
countries  exist only for the pupil-teacher  ratio.  The variable declines with per capita GNP in
secondary  education,  from an estimated  average  of 24 pupils per teacher for countries  at $200 in
per capita income, to  about 12-13 for countries  at $10,000 and above.  In higher education,
however,  the pattern is flat, at about 16-17 students  per teacher across the entire income range
represented  in our data. Moreover,  the R2 statistic  is modest,  particularly  among countries  below
$3,000 in per capita GNP, at 0.13 and 0.01, respectively,  at the two levels of education.  As2.3 Education outcomes in quantity and quality
We focus here on school life expectancy and the intake rate in primary education
as measures of quantity (i.e. coverage), and scores on international mathematics and science tests
as a measure of quality (i.e. student learning).1 2
Coverage of the education system. The first indicator of coverage, the school life
expectancy, is defined as the number of years of schooling the average child can expect to attain
as  he or  she grows up,  given  the education system's  current  structure of  enrollments.  The
indicator therefore succinctly captures the system's  overall coverage.  The other indicator, the
intake rate to grade 1, is defined as the percentage of each age cohort that enter school.
Figure 5 shows the expected positive relation between the two indicators and the
per capita GNP.  Children in the poorest countries expect, on average, to be in school less than
half as long as their counterparts in the richest countries; and the entry rate to first grade ranges
from an estimated 75 percent in the former countries, to nearly universal entry in countries at or
above $4,000 in per capita GNP.  There is nonetheless  substantial disparity across countries,
especially in the intake rate.  Among the poorer countries in the sample, the variable ranges from
a low of less than 30 percent in Mali and Niger, for example, to nearly universal intake in Laos,
and Kenya.  The wide disparity is reflected in the moderately low value of the R2 statistic for the
regression between the intake rate and the per capita GNP-0.30  for the whole sample, and 0.24
for the restricted sample.
12 Data are available  on other indicators  of coverage,  but we exclude them here to save space. Gross enrollment  ratios are a
common  measure of coverage. The data indicate  that they relate positively  to the per capita GNP at all three levels of
education,  with  a reasonably  close  fit, as indicated  by a R 2 statistic  of 0.31 in primary  education,  0.65 in secondary  education,
and 0.55 in higher  education. Another  variable of coverage  is the transition  rate between cycles  of education;  the available
data relate  to the transition  between  the primary  and secondary  cycles. The data again  show  that it relates  positively  to the per
capita  GNP:  among  the poorest countries,  slightly  more  than half of primary  school  leavers enter  secondary  school,  compared
with nearly  universal  entry  for countries  with  per capita  GNP at or above  $10,000. The relation  is also moderately  tight,  with
an R 2 statistic  of 0.46  for the whole  sample;  the corresponding  value  for  the restricted  sample  is much  more  modest  at 0.  15.- 12 -
Figure  5: Relation  between  school  life expectancy  and grade 1 intake rate  and the per capita  GNP, circa 1993
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Student learning.  The  cognitive skills  that school leavers  bring to the labor force
is the other important  dimension  of educational  outcome.  1 3 For our purpose we amalgamate  test
scores from several  rounds of international  mathematics  and science tests administered  to 9-14
year old children in the 1990s.1 4 The resulting  indicator  of achievement  is calibrated to range
between  0 and 100 percent,  and is interpreted  here as a summary  measure of the achievement  of
children  around  the end of primary  education  and  the beginning  of lower  secondary  education.
Figure 6 shows  the relation  between the indicator and per capita GNP in 1993.
Predictably,  test scores are generally  higher  among  children  in richer than poorer countries. The
relation is relatively weak, however, with a  regression  R2 statistic of only 0.17, implying
substantial  variation among  countries. It therefore  appears  that differences  in student learning  is
not just a function of country wealth, but is probably also the result of differences in policy
choices  that ultimately  affect  the effectiveness  of education  processes  within the classroom.
3 For examples  of studies  on the relation  between  worers' cognitive  sklfls  and work  productivity,  see Murnane,  Richard,  J. John  B.
Willet, andFrank  Levy  (1994). 'Ihe growng  impn  tance of cognitive  skills  in wage  determination,"  Harvard  Graduate  School  of
Education  (rnimeo);  and Bishop,  John  (1991)  "Achievement,  test scores,  and relative  wages,"  in Marvin  H. Kosters  (ed.)  Workers
and Their  Wages,  Washington  D.C.:  The  AEI  Press.
4 The raw data  pertain  to some  53 countres, and come  from the various  international  science  and mathematics  tests (e.g.  the Third
International  Mathematics  and Science  Study)  and conveniently  reported  in Jong-Wha  Lee and Robert J. Banro,  1997  "School
quality  in a cross-section  of countries"  National  Bureau  of  Economic  Research,  Working  paper  no.  6198,  Cambridge,  Mass. Not all
countries  patcipated in all the tests We  used regression  estimates  relating  one test  score  to another  to fill the gaps,  and to produce
a single  test score  incoporating  all  the available  information.  The  procedure  produced  data  on  44 observations.- 13 -
Figure  6: Relation  between  international  achievement  score  and per capita  GNP, circa early 1990s
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2.4  Efficiency of the education system
By efficiency  we refer to two aspects  of the education  system's operation:  student
flow patterns,  and output per unit of public  spending  on education.
Efficiency  of student  flow.  The available data pertain to the first 8 grades of
schooling. In primary education,  high dropout  rates imply inefficient  systems  because children
who quit before completing  the cycle, or who do so with less than four years of schooling,  are
unlikely to become  permanently  literate and numerate. Grade repetition  also leads to wastage
because repeaters  use at least twice as much resources  as other pupils  to attain the same amount
of education. To measure the combined  influence  of these problems  we construct an index of
student flow efficiency  which is benchmarked  against a system in which no child repeats or
drops out. 15 An index of 100 means that all pupils complete primary school and that no one
repeats; a  smaller value, say 60, means that with a given amount of resources the  system
produces  only 60 percent as many primary  school completers  as a system  with no dropouts  and
no repeaters. The relation  between  the index and  the per capita GNP appears  in figure 7.
5 For details  on the constuction  of the summary  index,  see Mingat,  Alain and Jee-Peng  Tan (1998) "Analyzing  problems  in the
structure  of sudent flow,"  mimeo,  Hmnm  Development  Department,  The  World  Bank.-14-
Figure 7: The relation between  efficiency  of student flow in primary education and the per capita
GNP, circa 1993
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As  expected  the  overall  efficiency  of  student  flow  in  an  education  system
improves as incomes rise; by the time incomes reaches $20,000 per person, dropping out and
grade repetition are almost completely absent.  The relation between the index and per  capita
GNP is relatively loose-as  indicated by a R statistic of 0.44 for the whole sample, and 0.15 for
countries  below  $4,000  in  per  capita  income-which  means that  although  poor  countries
generally have less efficient patterns of student flow, differences in policy  choice  and  sector
management probably makes an appreciable difference to how efficiently the system operates.
The separate behavior of dropping out and grade repetition relative  to the  per
capita GNP is documented in table 2 (top two blocks), based on regression simulations.  In the
poorest countries, only about two-thirds of first graders complete the primary cycle, compared
with universal completion in the richest countries.  The difference implies that education systems
in the former countries are only about three-quarters as efficient, if we take into account only the
impact of dropping out.  Differences in grade repetition add to the inefficiency, the rate being
estimated at  17 percent  in the poorest countries, compared with  only 3 percent  in the richest
ones.  Considering only the impact of this factor, the education systems of the poorest countries
are only about four-fifths as efficient as those of the richest countries.  The shortfall in efficiency
associated with dropping out is greater than that associated with grade repetition, a pattern that
holds across the entire income range represented in the data.-15  -
Table 2: Simulated indicators of student flow at selected per capita GNP, circa 1993
Per capita GNP, 1993 $  R2
Indicator
200  400  800  1,500  3,000  10,000  20,000  (1)  (2)
Dropping out, primary cycle
%grade  I entrants reaching the end  62.4  68.1  73.8  79.0  84.7  94.6  100.3  0.45  0.16
Dropout-related efficiency index al  74.4  80.3  84.9  88.3  91.5  95.9  97.9  0.38  0.11
Grade repetition, primary cycle
% repeaters  17.2  13.7  10.9  8.8  6.9  4.2  3.0  0.31  0.11
Repetition-related efficiency index b/  82.7  86.3  89.1  91.2  93.2  95.8  97.1  0.31  0.11
Among pupils exiting before end of grade 8
% leaving between prim. and sec. cycles  46.4  58.8  68.7  76.0  82.8  92.1  96.4  0.61  0.27
a/ Measured  relative  to a value  of 100  which  corresponds  to a system  in which  no pupils  drops out  before  completing  the cycle.
b/ Measured  relative  to a value  of 100  which  corresponds  to a system  with  no repeaters.
Note: The  R 2 corresponds,  in column  (1), to a regression  of the indicator  concerned  to the natural  logarithm  of the per capita  GNP  and its
square,  based  on data  for the whole  sample;  and in column  (2), to the same  regression  based  on data for countries  with  a per capita  income
below $4,000  in 1993.
The last line in the table pertains to the efficiency of student flow from grade 1 to
grade 8, using as an indicator the percentage of school leavers who exit from the system in the
interval between the primary and lower secondary cycles rather than within either cycle.  The
larger  the  percentage,  the  more  children  complete  their  studies  rather  than  abandon  them
halfway, and the more efficient the pattern  of student flow.  An index of  100 means that all
selection takes place between the two cycles.'6 As countries grow richer, the efficiency of inter-
cycle student selection improves: the share of pupils leaving between  cycles is only 46.4 for
countries at $200 in per capita, compared with 96.4 for countries at $20,000.  The R 2 statistic is
0.61 for the whole sample, suggesting the efficiency of student selection rises in a predictable
fashion as incomes increase.  Among countries with per capita income below $4,000, however,
the R2 statistic drops to only 0.27, indicating much greater diversity in the efficiency of student
selection, as well as greater scope for countries to influence the outcome through policy choice.
Efficiency  of resource use in education.  To assess cross-country differences in
this regard, we first  relate education outcomes  to the input of public resources in  the sector,
defining  outcomes  in  two  ways:  (a)  years  of  school  life  expectancy;  and  (b)  scores  on
16 Because  dropping  out within  the secondary  cycle  tends  to occur  less  frequently  than at the primary  level,  a small  index  may usually
be interpreted  as signifying  significant  dropping  out within  primary  education.- 16-
international  achievement  tests.  17  Figure 8 shows  while the former  indicator tends to rise with
the level of aggregate spending,  the latter is flat against  spending  per pupil. There is, moreover,
substantial  cross-country  variation  even  among  those  with similar  levels  of spending.
Figure 8: Relation between schooling  outcomes  and input of public resources, circa 1993
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Deviations from the  regression line in  the  figure provide one  measure of
efficiency  in resource  use: positive  deviations  signal  better  than average  efficiency  because more
is produced  for the same  level of spending,  and negative  deviations  signal the opposite. For both
outcome indicators, the  deviations relate positively to  per capita GNP, implying that the
education systems of richer countries  tend to be more efficient than those of poorer countries.
As before, however,  the general  tendency  masks  large variations  across  countries:  the R2 statistic
for the relevant regressions  range between 0.10 and 0.50, suggesting  that country  wealth is not
the only, or even the most important,  factor in determining  how efficiently  an education  system
operates.
2.5 Equity  in access and resource allocation
We examine here two aspects of equity in education: gender disparities and the
distribution  of public  spending  on education.
7 Because  private  financing  of education  differs  across  countries  and are probably  influenced  by  policies  toward  private  education
(including  the level of public spending  itself) the indicator  actually  refers  to the efficiency  of public spending  on education
working directly  through government  provision  of services,  as well as through its catalytic effect in leveraging private
resources  for  education.-17-
Gender disparities. Girls in low-income  countries  generally  have fewer chances
for schooling  than boys. For example,  a girl's school  life expectancy  in a country  at a per capita
GNP  of $200 is, on average,  only three-quarters  as long as that of a boy's.  Girls catch up with
boys as incomes grow, and are on par with them by the time incomes reach about $3,000 per
capita. Low entry rates to first grade, as well as low survival  rates within primary education  are
the main reasons why girls have shorter school life expectancies. Figure 9 shows that girls'
schooling  generally  improve  with country  wealth,  but the path of improvement  is diverse across
countries. Among countries  at a per capita  income  of $400,  for example,  girls in some countries
enter first grade at the same  rate as boys  while in other  countries  they are only half as likely  to do
so as boys. Similarly,  among  countries  at this income level,  girls' survival  rates range from only
half as high as boys; to 1.3  times as high.
Figure  9: Relation between gender disparity in education and per capita GNP, circa 1993
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Distribution  of public spending on education.  Among many possible indicators
we use two relatively simple ones for which data are available for most countries: (a) public
spending  per primary  pupil as a percentage  of spending  per secondary  pupil; and (b) the share of
public spending  on education  benefiting  the 10 percent best educated  in a cohort. The latter is
constructed  from data on the structures  of enrollments  and public spending  per student by level
of education.  It therefore is a succinct measure of inequities  in the pattern of spending on
lSThe  constution  of  the  indicator  is explained  in  detail  in  Mingat  and  Tan  1986.-18-
education  that arise both from the structure  of enrollment  and that of spending  per pupil across
levels of education. The steeper  is the rise in public  spending  per pupil as the level of education
rises, and the fewer are the opportunities  for people  to proceed up the educational  ladder, the
bigger the share of public spending  received by the best education  in a cohort, and the more
inequitable  is the distribution  of public  spending  on education.
Figure 10 describes  the relation between both indicators of equity and the per
capita GNP. It reveals  a consistent  picture  of increasing  equity as countries  grow rich. The ratio
in per pupil spending between primary and secondary  education  in a country at $200 in per
capita income is,  on average, only about 0.40 times as high as the corresponding  ratio in
countries  above $10,000 in income. The ratio shows  only a moderately  tight relation  to the per
capita GNP,  with a R2  statistic  of around 0.37  for the regressions  based  on both the whole sample
and the restricted  sample  of countries  below $4,000  in per capita  GNP.
Figure  10: Relation  between  selected  indicators  of equity  in public  spending  on education  and the
per capita  GNP, circa  1993
(A) Public spending per pupil  (B) Cohares 10%A  bat  e&xated
125  S0  - o0 
0  0  0  00
0  0 
100  00  00  0 
0  0  0 
Cb  o  0~~~~~~~
'0  0  00
07  4  0  00  100  000  00
0  00
0  CID  ~~  ~~  ~~~~~0  0  00
0  ~~~~~~~~  00
50  0  0  0  44  ~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~0  00
0  00  0  1  20  0  C0
0  00  0  0  0'  0  00  OOo
0  0~  ~~10
200  400  80  10  6  3006  1OODO  20000  200o  1306  3006  I0000  20000
Pe  capita ONP (log scale)  Per capibt GNP (log scale)
Equity  measured  in terms of the distribution  of the public  spending  by educational
attainment  also show dramatic  differences  between  rich and poor countries. Among countries  at
the low end of the income scale,  the best educated  10 percent  in a cohort receives,  on average,  55
percent of the total public spending on that cohort's education,  compared with an average of
about 13 percent-only  slightly  more  than their population  share-for  countries  at the top end of- 19-
for the whole sample, but only 0.54 for the restricted sample of poorer countries.  As with the
first indicator, the results suggest that although equity in education follows a predictable relation
to  the per  capita GNP, differences  in policy  probably also  account for part  of the  observed
diversity across countries.
2.6 Summary of the relation between country wealth and education
In  the  foregoing discussion  we  have  considered  how selected  features  of  the
education system relate to country wealth, in terms of both the structure and the closeness of the
fit between each indicator and the per capita GNP. With regard to structure, the patterns fall into
four categories: (a) rising consistently against per capita GNP; (b) falling consistently against it;
(c) flat against it; or (d) rising against it over some income range and falling over other ranges (or
vice versa).  With regard to the closeness of the fit, we discern on the basis of the RP statistic
associated with the regression equations, that some relationships show a tight fit, while others
reveal a moderate to loose fit, and yet others, hardly any fit at all.  The data indicate that the
relationships are almost always less tight among lower income countries (i.e. those below $4,000
in 1993) which imply generally greater diversity among them.
Of the indicators pertaining to the sector context, three strong patterns emerge: a
continuous easing of the demographic pressures on education as countries grow rich; a steady
rise in the educational attainment of the adult population, which flattens out as incomes continue
to rise beyond $10,000; and a sharp shift in employment out of agriculture.  All three variables
follow  a highly predictable path as incomes rise.19 The other variables describing the sector
context  show the following behavior:  the government's  fiscal capacity is  flat against the per
capita GNP up to around $1,500, after which it shows a gradual but steady rise, while the share
of education in the public budget rises then falls as incomes grow.  Neither variable shows a
close fit to the per capita GNP.
On the production of education services, significant shifts occur as countries grow
rich, as indicated by the following trends: shifts in the allocation of spending away from primary
education  to  the  other  two  levels;  a  generally  rising  per  pupil-spending  (expressed  as  a
percentage of the per capita GNP) at the primary level, accompanied by sharp drops in the pupil-
teacher ratio and  average  teacher salaries  (again expressed  as a percentage  of the per  capita
GNP); and a sharply declining per pupil spending in higher education at low incomes which then
flattens  out as incomes continue rise beyond  $3,000.  The shares of spending on pedagogical
9 The relation between the demographic  burden and the per capita GNP is less tight among countries with for income below $4,000,
and reflects their diverse history of demographic  transition experienced.-20 -
materials is flat up to about $3,000 in per capita GNP, after which it rises appreciably, but the
share of  spending  on  student  aid show  first  a  negative then  positive  trend  against  income.
Finally, the private sector share of enrollments is flat across the income range in our data.  For all
the indicators, the relation to the per capita GNP is only moderately tight.
Education outcomes in terms of coverage show large improvements as countries
grow rich: the school life expectancy ratio nearly doubles as the per capita GNP rises from $200
to $3,000, and entry rates into first grade becomes universal.  In contrast, improvements in scores
on international tests improve much more gradually.  The relation between the various indicators
of coverage and the per capita GNP is moderately tight, but that between student learning and the
per capita GNP is looser.  The result suggests that countries at comparable income levels can and
do make policy choices that differ in the impact on sector outcomes.
With regard to  efficiency,  all the indicators  relate positively  to  the per  capita
GNP.  As  incomes rise  above $10,000 per person, problems  such as dropping  out and grade
repetition at the primary level all but disappear, and most school leavers exit the system between
cycles  of  study rather  than  within  a  cycle.  As  incomes  rise,  countries  also  produce  more
coverage or student learning per unit of public spending.  None of the indicators show a very
close fit to  the per  capita  GNP, however,  so that  country income  explains  only part  of the
differences. Even among poor countries choices can and do make a difference to how efficiently
the education system operates.
Finally, we also considered the relation between equity in education and the per
capita GNP.  The trends are again striking: girls'  entry rate to grade 1 rise to match boys' by the
time the per capita GNP exceeds $3,000, and their survival rate in primary cycle reach the same
level as boys' as the per capita income passes the $10,000 mark.  The gap in per pupil spending
between primary  and  secondary  education  closes  as  incomes  rise,  and  the  share  of  public
spending garnered by the 10 percent best educated in a cohort falls continuously over the income
range  in  our  sample-both  trends  indicating  increasing  equity  in  the  course  of  economic
development.  In general the indicators of equity show only a moderately close fit to  the per
capita GNP.-21 -
3. What Are The Sources Of Rich Countries' Advantage In Education?
Having describe  the key patterns in the relation  between the per capita GNP and
the various indicators of educational development we are now in a position to examine the
sources of rich countries  advantage in education. We know, for example, that demographic
burdens ease,  that spending  on education  rise, and that teachers  become  less expensive,  as the per
capita GNP increase,  but how important  are each of these factors and what is their  joint impact
on the availability  of resources for education? How do countries make the tradeoff between
expanding coverage and raising per pupil-spending with  the  extra resources that become
available  in the course of economic  development? What implicit priorities in education  do the
trends reveal  about  the path of educational  development  as country  incomes  rise?
3.1 A framework  for the analysis
We develop  here a simple  accounting  framework  to disaggregate  both the sources
and use of the increased  resource available for education  as countries grow richer.  We begin
with the following  identity:
Ge  e  . Psa  Pt  (1)
GNP  PPa  P,  GNP
where Ge refers  to total public spending on education;  GNP is the gross national product;  Psa  is
the school-aged  population; and Pt is the total population. Ignoring spending on pedagogical
materials to  simplify the presentation, the  first component on  the  right-hand-side  can be
expressed  as follows:
Ge  Ge  Pe  TS  *T  Pe  (2)
Psa  Pe  Psa  Pe  Psa
where TS is average  teacher  pay, T is the number  of teachers, and Pe is the enrolled  population.
Thus, equation  (1) can be expressed  as:
Ge  TS *  T  Pe  Psa  Pt
GNP  Pc  Psa  Pt  GNP
Rearranging,  we can rewrite  it as follows:-22 -
Ge  1  1  P.  1  (1)
GNP  Psa  / P,  TS/(GNP/P  )  Psa  Pe  /T
In this expression, the right-hand-side contains two terms: Pe/Psa  is the share of the school-aged
population that is enrolled; and Pe/T is the pupil-teacher ratio.  The former is a measure of the
coverage of the education system, while the latter is one measure of the quality of the schooling
environment. 20
The  left-hand-side  contains  various  terms  relating  to  resource  availability:
Ge/GNP is public spending on education as a share of the GNP; Psa/Pt  is the demographic burden
on the education system; and TS/(GNP/Pt) is average teacher pay relative to the per capita GNP,
the latter being simply the GNP divided by the total population (Pt). The first term, Ge/GNP, can
be  written  as  the  product  of  Gt/GNP and  Ge/Gt, which  are  respectively  the  ratio  of  total
government  spending  (Gt) to  GNP,  and  public  spending  on  education  as  a  share  of  total
government spending:
G  _  Gt  G5 (2)
GNP  GNP  Gt
Substituting equation (2) into (1"), we obtain the following expression:
Gt  Ge  1  1  P  . 1  (1''I)
GNP  Gt  PSa  /Pt  TS/(GNP/P 1 )  Psa  Pe /T
Equation (1  "') provides a basis for comparing educational development across any
two countries or types of countries (or even the same country at two points in time). 21 To make
the comparison, we would simply compute the ratio of the data for the two countries for each of
the items in the equation.  Taking country A as the reference, for example, the ratios on the right-
hand-side  would  indicate  country  B's  relative  advantage (or  lack  thereof)  over  A  in  terms
resources available for education.  The ratios on the right-hand-side would indicate how country
B uses the extra resources to expand coverage and reduce the pupil-teacher ratio.
20 The  pupil-teacher  ratio  is admittedly  an imperfect  indicator  of educational  quality.  We  nonetheless  use it here  as it relates  directly  to
the resource  intensity  of the learning  environment  to which  students  are  exposed.
21 As will  become  apparent  below,  it does require  some modification  to accommodate  the nature  of the available  data. Used  as a
conceptual  framework,  however,  it  helps  to  organize  analysis  of the sources  of educational  growth-23 -
3.2 Rich countries' advantage in overall educational development
For our purpose we define two generic countries, a poor one with  a per capita
22 GNP of $200 (country A), and a richer one with a per capita GNP of $3,000 (country B).  We
simulate for both  countries the values of the various  components in  equation  (1  "')  based on
regression  estimates  of the  relation between per  capita  GNP  and  each of  the  corresponding
indicators. 23 Below we consider the two sides of the equation in turn.
Advantage  in  resources  available for  education.  The  left  hand-side  of  the
equation pertains to resource availability for the education.  Table 3 shows the simulated values
of the various components for the two  countries.  The share of total  government  spending in
GNP (Gt/GNP) is estimated  at 26.8 percent  for  country A, and  31.7 percent  for  country B.
Similarly, the share of education in total government spending is estimated at 13.4 percent and
16.7 percent respectively.  Note that the table lists an item not explicitly incorporated in equation
(1"'): the share of spending on education allocated to student financial aid.  We include it here
because it is relatively  sizable, at an estimated 9.8 percent  for country A, and  5.4 percent for
country B.
Focussing first on these three items in the table, we note that more resources are
available for education in country B because overall government spending relative to the GNP is
bigger (by  18 percent)  and the  share  of education in  overall  spending is  also bigger  (by 25
percent).  As a percentage of GNP, public spending on education in country B amounts to 5.3
percent (=31.7 x 16.7 /  100), compared with 3.6 percent in country A; thus, country B's overall
spending on education is 1.47 times  (=5.3/3.6) that in country A.  Adjusting the spending for
allocations to student aid, the resources available for school operations amount to 3.2 percent of
GNP (=3.6 x (1-0.098)) in country A, and 5.0 percent (=5.3 x (1-0.054) in country B.  Thus, the
relative advantage of B in terms of budget allocations for school operations rises to  1.55 times
(=5.0/3.2), reflecting the combined influence of all three factors.  By implication, the gain in
resource availability due to the smaller share of student aid is about 5 percent (=1.55/1.47).
22 All monetary values are denominated in 1993 constant dollars.
23 Recall that the regression estimates are based on the data for all the countries in our sample, as described in section 2 above.-24 -
Table 3: Sources  of rich country  advantage  in resource  availability  for education
Country and per capita  Country B's  % contribution
Indicator  Item in  GNP  advantage  to country B's
equation (1)  A: $200  B: $3,000  over A d'  advantage
Budget allocations
Overall govt. budget as % of GNP'  G,GNP  26.8  31.7  1.18  12.1
Education as % of overall govt. budget  G,/Gt  13.4  16.7  1.25  16.3
Student aid as % of education budget  9.8  5.4  1.05  1.8
Education budget as % of GNP  3.2  5.0  1.55  30.2
Demographic burden a  P.a/Pt  23.0  17.5  1.31  18.9
Teacher pay b'  TS/(GNP/P)  6.3  3.0  2.08  50.9
Spending per school-aged population c/  - - - 4.23  100
Source:  columns  3 and 4 are simulated  from regression  estimates  of the relation  between  the corresponding  indicator  and per
capita GNP, based on the data for some 125 countries  in 1993;  the last two columns  are authors'  computation,  following
procedures  explained  in the text.
a/ Population  aged 6-1  1 as percent  of total population.
b/ As ratio of the per capita  GNP.
c/ This item  is equal  to the product  of the components  on the left-hand-side  of equation  (1"'), i.e. the product  of the first two
items  in column  2, and the inverse  of the third  and fourth  items  in the column.
d/ In the framework  of equation (1"'), country  B's advantage  is computed,  for the first two items listed, as the ratio of its
indicator  to that  of A; and for the last  two items,  as the inverse  of its indicator  to that of A. For the third item,  the calculation  is
explained  in the text.
We turn next to consider the other sources of country B's advantage in resource
availability for education.  A lighter demographic burden  is an important source of advantage
because it means more can be spent per school-age child. 24 Table 3 shows that whereas the share
of the school-age children in the population is 23 percent in country A, it is only 17.5 percent in
country B.  With a smaller  school-age population  country B can allocate more resources  for
education per child.  If A and B have the same aggregate budget for education as well as the
same population size, the resources available per child of school-age would in fact be 31 percent
(= (23.0/17.5) x 100) greater in country B.
Finally, because teachers are a key input in the production of education services,
differences  in  the  relative  cost  of  teachers  also  influence the  resources  that  are  effectively
available for education.  As countries grow richer in the course of economic development the
prices of most  goods and services tend to rise  in absolute terms, as does teachers'  pay.  Our
simulations show that  teachers  earn, on average,  $9,084 a year in  country B compared  with
24 For  our purpose  we measure  demographic  burden  as the ratio  of the population  aged  6-1  1 to the total  population.  Because  our focus
here is on overall  educational  development,  it would  have been  better  to include  in the numerator  the population  over  a wider  age
range,  say  6-23,  so as to encompass  students  at al three  levels  of schooling.  However,  population  structures  are  relatively  stable,  and
as the accounting  exercise  involves  comparing  relative  rather  than absolute  demographic  burdens,  we simply  used the population
data  that  are most  readily  available,  i.e.  those  for  the  population  aged  6-11,  to compute  the  demographic  burden.-25 -
$1,262 in country A, for a pay ratio of 7.12.25 When teachers' pay are expressed in terms of each
country's per capita GNP, however, teacher pay in country B is actually lower, at 3.0 times the
per capita GNP, compared with 6.3 times in country A.  If teacher pay in country B had risen at
the same rate as the rise in per capita GNP from $200 to $3,000, its absolute level would have
been $18,900, instead of the  simulated $9,084.  The implication is that the same amount of
aggregate resources for education can purchase 2.08 times (=6.3/3.0) as much teacher time in
country B as in country A.
Taking into account  all six components listed in the table-overall  government
budget, education's  share in  that  budget, allocation to  student aid, demographic burden,  and
teacher pay-the  net resources for education available in country B is 4.22 times (=1.18 x 1.25 x
1.05 x  1.31 x  2.08) that  in  country A.  The  last column  in the  table  shows the percentage
contribution  of  the  various  factors  to  country's  B  advantage  in  resource  availability  for
education.26 More than half the advantage can be traced to the decline in teacher pay relative to
the per capita GNP, making it the single most important factor in accounting for differences in
resource  availability between rich  and poor  countries.  Significantly, easing  of demographic
burden  contributes  only  about  a  fifth  of  the  advantage,  while  the  increased  spending  by
governments contributes the remaining 30 percent.
Gains in coverage and quality  We turn now to the right-hand-side of equation
(1"').  Recall that it breaks down spending on education into two components: (a) coverage as
reflected in the share of the school-age population that  is enrolled; and (b) the quality  of the
learning environment as proxied by the pupil-teacher  ratio.  For coverage, we use school life
expectancy  as  a  convenient  summary  measure  of  enrollment  ratios  at  the  three  levels  of
schooling.  For the pupil-teacher ratio use the average of the ratios at each of the three levels of
education, weighted  by the corresponding  enrollment ratio.  As before, the data  for the two
generic countries we are comparing-one  at a per capita GNP of $200, and the other at $3,000-
are simulated from regression estimates of the relation between each of the indicators and the per
capita GNP.
25 The pay refers  to the average  across  all three levels of education,  weighted  by the corresponding  enrollment  ratios. Data  were
sufficiently  plentiful  for regression  analysis  only  for the pay of primary  school  teachers;  for  the other  two levels,  however,  the data
are much  scarcer.  We  assume  that  the pay of teachers  at the secondary  and higher  levels  are 1.5  and 2.5  times  as high  as that  at the
primary  level,  based  on the ratios  for secondary  education  for  selected  countries  reported  in Tan  and Mingat  (1992)  and SPESSA,
and on our  informed  judgement  for  higher  education.
26 Because  the aggregate  advantage  is computed  as a product  of the various  ratios between  the two countries'  data,  the percentage
contribution  of each  factors  is  computed  simply  by dividing  the  logarithm  of the corresponding  ratio  by the logarithm  of the product;
for example,  the contribution  of the greater  size  of overall  public  spending  in country  B is estimated  to contribute  12.1  percent  (=
ln(1.18yln(4.22)]  x 100)  to B's overall  advantage  overA in resource  availability.-26 -
The results appear in table 4.  School life expectancy in country B is estimated to be
1.8 times that in country A-10.8  years compared with 6.0 years.  The pupil-teacher ratio, on the
other hand is lower, 19.8 pupils per teacher, compared with 38.5 in country A, implying that
other things being the same, per pupil spending in country B is 1.95 times (=38.5/19.8) as high as
in country A.  The product of these two ratios reflect the aggregate resources  expended per
school-aged child in country B as a ratio of the resources expended per child in country A.  The
ratios  imply that  46.9  percent  of  the  extra  resources  in  country  B  are  deployed  to  expand
coverage, while the remaining 53.1 percent are invested to improve the learning environment via
a reduction in the pupil-teacher ratio. 27
Table 4: Expansion  of coverage  and decline  in the pupil-teacher  ratio  as countries  grow rich
Country and per capita  Country B's  % contribution
Indicator  Item in  G(  AP  advantage  to country B's
equation (1')  A: $200  B: $3,000  over A c/  advantage
Overall coverage  Pe/Psa  6.0  10.8  1.80  46.9
Pupil-teacher ratio  Pe/T  38.5  19.8  1.95  53.1
Spending per school-aged child i  3.51  100
Source:  columns  3 and 4 are simulated  from regression  estimates  of the relation  between  the corresponding  indicator  and
per capita  GNP,  based  on the data  for some 125  countries  in 1993;  the last two columns  are authors'  computation,  following
procedures  explained  in the text.
a/ Proxied  by the school  life expectancy  which is defined  as the expected  number  of years of schooling  given the current
structure  of enrollment  rates  across  the three levels  of schooling.
b/ This is the product  of the components  on the right-hand-side  of equation  (1"'),  i.e. the product  of the first item  in the next
column  and the inverse  of the second  item.
c/ In the framework  of equation  (1"'),  B's advantage  is computed,  for the first item listed, as the ratio of its indicator  to that
of country  A; and for the second  item, as the inverse  of its ratio to that of A.
Because equation (1"') is an identity, we expect the product of the components of
both sides of it to have the same value.  Yet based on the data in table  4., the product on the
right-hand-side is 3.51 (=1.80 x 1.95), which is only about 83 percent of 4.22, the corresponding
figure on the left-hand-side shown in the previous table.  Data flaws and incompleteness are a
possible source of the discrepancy, but the aggregation of data for the three levels of education-
on coverage, teacher pay and pupil-teacher ratio-into  a single synthetic indicator representing
the system as a whole, may also have contributed to it.  To avoid this problem, we repeat the
disaggregation exercise below, focussing on only one level of education, the primary level, for
which the available data are more complete.
27 These  percentages  are calculated  in the same  way as those completed  earlier  showing  the sources  of contribution  to the rise in
resource  availability. For example,  the estimated  share of resources  used to expand coverage,  46.9 percent,  is evaluated  as
ln(1.8)/(ln(1.95  x 1.80))  x 100.-27 -
3.3 Rich countries' advantage in primary education
Before proceeding  we expand the left-hand-side of equation  (1"')  by an extra
term, the share of primary education in total public spending on education. The equation for the
disaggregation exercises is as follows:
Gt  Ge  Gp  1  1  P  1
GNP  G,  Ge  Psa Pt  TS / (GNP / Pt)  Psa  Pe  (3T
We ignore spending on student financial aid, as it is negligible at this level of education.  We
also exclude spending on pedagogical materials on the grounds that the percentages involved are
small, ranging from  1.5 percent of total public spending on primary education, in the poorest
countries to about 6 to 8 percent among OECD countries.  2
Data on the items in equation (3) for countries at selected per capita GNP in 1993
appear in table 5, the unshaded block containing items on the left-hand-side of the equation, and
the  shaded  block,  items  on  the  right-hand-side.  As  before,  each  item  is  simulated  from
regression estimates of the relation between it and the per capita GNP.  The simulations reveal a
similar  pattern  as  incomes  rise:  generally  expanding  total  government  spending,  growing
allocation  to  education,  easing of  the  demographic  burden,  falling  relative  teacher  salaries,
expanding coverage and declining pupil-teacher  ratios.  Note, however, that as incomes grow,
the share of primary education in total public spending on education falls, from 45 percent  in
countries at  $200 in per  capita GNP, to  33 percent  in  those at $10,000.  Below  we use the
simulations to the compare the differences in education between pairs of countries at contiguous
levels of per capita GNP.
28 That the omission  is unlikely  to affect  our calculations  is suggested  by the results  reported  in table 2.1 relating  to student  aid.
Spending  on student  aid as a percentage  of total  spending  on education  changed  from 9.8  percent  in one country  to 5.4  percent  in  the
other,  but the change  contributed  only 1.8  percent  to the total  increase  in resources  available  for school  operations.  By implication,
incorporating  spending  for pedagogical  materials,  will  make  an even smaller  contribution.  Thus,  to keep the computations  simple
we  choose  to ignore  this component  of spending.-28:-
Table 5: Simulations  of education  indicators  by level of per capita GNP, 1993
Indicatora/  Item in  Per capita GNP, 1993
equation (3)  $200  $400  $800  $1,500  $3,000  $10,000
Total govt. budget as % of GNP  Gt / GNP  26.2  26.2  26.8  28.6  31.7  40.2
Education share of total govt. budget (%)  Ge/ G,  13.4  15.1  16.2  16.7  16.7  15.5
Primary ed. as share of total ed. budget (%)  Gp  / Ge  45.1  43.0  40.8  38.9  36.8  33.1
School-aged  children's  share  of  population  Psa  /  P,  23.0  21.6  20.2  18.9  17.5  15.1
Teacher  pay  relative  to  per  capita  GNP  TS  /  (GNP/Pt)  5.4  4.3  3.4  2.7  2.2  1.7
Source:  simulated  from regression  estimates  of the relation  between  each indicator  and the  per capita  GNP,  based  on data  for a sample  of
some 125  countries  in 1993.
a/ The  enrollment  rates is defined  as the proportion  of each age cohort  that is enrolled  at the end of the primary  cycle;  we chose  this
indicator  rather  than  the more  common  gross  or net  enrollment  ratios  because  it offers  a more  accurate  picture  of coverage.
Comparing countries with per capita GNP of $200 and $400. For simplicity, we
shall refer to these countries as A and B, respectively.  Table 6 shows the advantage of B over A
in terms of resources  available  for primary  education, as well as in  the deployment of those
resources to expand coverage and reduce the pupil-teacher ratio.  As before, the unshaded rows
in the table correspond to the left-hand-side of the accounting equation (i.e. equation (3)), while
the shaded rows correspond to the right hand-hand-side.
The results in the table show that there is no difference between the two countries
in overall government budget; but in the share of education in the overall government budget in
country B is 1.13 times that in country A.  However, because primary education's share of the
education budget in country B is smaller than in country A, the resources available for primary
education relative to the GNP are in fact only 1.07 times (=1.13 x 0.95) as high as in country A.
The other two sources of country B's resource advantage are a lighter demographic burden and
lower teacher salaries relative to the per capita GNP.  The share of its school-age population in
the  total population  is 21.6  percent,  compared with  23.0 percent  in  country A, implying  an
advantage for country B of 6.0 percent (=(23.0/21.6 - 1) x 100); and average teacher pay is 4.3
times  the per  capita GNP in country B, compared  with 5.4 times in  country A, implying an
advantage of 26 percent (=(5.4/4.3 - 1) x 100) for country B.-29-
Table 6: Comparing resource availability and education outcomes in countries at $400 and
$200 in per capita GNP, 1993
a/  Richer country's  Percentage
Indicator  gb  contribution to richer advantage  country's advantage
Budget allocations
Overall govermnent budget as % of GNP  1.00  0.0
Public spending on education as % of government budget  1.13  33.0
Primnary  education as % of public spending on education  0.95  -13.2
Primary education spending as % of GNP  1.07  19.8
School-aged  children's share of population  1.06  17.3
Teacher pay relative to per capita GNP  1.26  62.9
Public spending per primary school-aged child  1.43  100.0
Enolmenit  roe  I 21.  . 52.7
NPupil-teachfr  ratio  1'  !  .:.
Public  sphid  .4  e3  1-0.0
Source:  authors'  calculation  based  on data  in previous  table.
a! The  variables  that are not italicized  are defined  in the previous  table. The first  two italicized  variables  refer  to the net
impact  of the preceding  three variables;  while the last italicized  variable  refers  to the net impact of the preceding  two
variables.
b/ Following  equation  (3), the richer country's  advantage  for the indicators  in rows 1,2,3 and 8 are computed  as the
ratio between  its data and that of the poorer  country;  its advantage  in the indicators  in rows 5,6, and 9 are computed  as
the inverse  of the ratio between  its data and that of the poorer  country. For rows 4 and 7, the data are the products  of
the data  in the preceding  3 rows; and for row 10,  the figure  is the product  of the data in the preceding two rows.
Taking all the factors into account, the resources available per school-aged child
in country B is 1.43 times (=1.0 x 1.13 x 0.95 xl.06  x 1.26) as high as in country A.  The relative
contribution of the various sources to country B's resource advantage appears in the last column.
It shows that nearly two thirds of its advantage stem from the fact that teacher salaries in country
B fell relative to the per capita GNP.  Had teachers salaries maintained the same relation to the
per capita GNP as in country A, the availability of resources for primary education in country B
would have been only 1.14 times (=1.0 x 1.13 x 0.95 x 1.06 x 1.0) as high as that in country A.
Turning now to the resource deployment side of the equation, we note from the
data in the shaded part of the table  that country B uses its extra resources  to expand primary
school coverage by a factor of 1.21 relative to coverage in country A, and to increase spending-30-
per pupil by a factor of 1.18 via a reduction in the pupil-teacher  ratio. 29 The ratios imply that
about 52.7 percent of the extra resources available in country B are used to increase education
quantity, and the remaining 47.3 percent to improve quality.
Comparing countries with per  capita GNP from $200 to $10,000. Following the
same procedure as above, we can compare pairs of countries spanning the full range of per capita
GNP, from $200 to $10,000. The results relating to differences in resource availability appear in
table 7.30 Looking down column three, we note that in all the five pairs of countries, resource
availability for primary education in the richer country exceeds that in the poorer country by a
factor of between  1.32 and 1.46.  In other words, at every stage of per capita income growth
across the entire range from  $200 to  $10,000,  substantial resources  do become  available  for
primary education.
Table 7: Comparing resource availability for primary education in pairs of countries at selected
levels of per capita GNP, 1993
Per capita GNP  Percentage contribution to country B's advantage over country A
,M  Resource
availability  Increase in public spending  Easing of  Decline in
in B  Overall  Share of  Share of  Primary  demo-  relative  All
Country  Country  relative to  govt.  education  primary in  education  graphic  teacher  sources
A  B  A  budget  in govt.  education  budget in  burden  salaries
in GNP  budget  budget  GNP
200  400  1.43  0.0  33.0  -13.2  19.8  17.3  62.9  100%
400  800  1.39  6.6  20.5  -15.3  11.8  19.6  68.6  100 %
800  1,500  1.32  18.9  8.8  -13.8  13.8  19.3  66.9  100 %
1,500  3,000  1.32  31.3  0.0  -16.9  14.4  23.4  62.2  100%
3,000  10,000  1.46  51.4+-  -16.1  -22.9  12.3  31.9  55.8  100%
Source:  authors'  calculation-b-ased  on data  in table 5.
Increased government spending on primary education contributes between 12 and
20  percent  of  the increase  (see  column  7), reflecting  the  expansion  of  overall  government
budgets  and  increased  allocation  to  education  as  a  whole.  The  former  factor  becomes
29 Note that  the product  of these  ratios,  1.43  (=1.21  x 1.18)  is  the same  as the product  of the ratios  on  the left  hand side  of the equation.
30 The  first  row  relates  to the  data  for  the two  countries  at the  bottom  of the per  capita  income  scale-$200 and $400  respectively-that
were  already  examined  in  detail  above;  they  are included  here  for  completeness.-31 -
increasingly important as per capita  income rises, while the role of  the latter  declines.  For
example,  when  the  per  capita  income  doubles  from  $400  to  $800,  expansion  of  overall
government  spending  contributes  6.6  percent  to  the  increased  availability  of  resources  for
primary education, while growth in education's share in the government budget contributes 20.5
percent.  But  when the  per  capita  GNP  doubles  from  $1,500 to  $3,000,  the corresponding
percentage contribution from these factors are, respectively 31.3 percent  and zero percent (the
later implying no change in the budget share of education).  As  incomes rise from $3,000 to
$10,000, the budget share of education even goes into decline, compared with continued sizable
expansion of overall government spending.  At all income levels, the share of primary education
in  public  spending  on  education declines  as  income  rises,  by  between  13  and  22  percent.
However, the declining share is more than compensated for by the trends in overall government
spending and allocations to education, resulting in net increases in public  spending on primary
education relative to the GNP at all income levels.
With  regard  to  the  other  two  factors  contributing  to  increased  resources  for
primary education, the easing of demographic pressures account for between 17 and 32 percent
of the richer country's  advantage, the contribution being smaller at the lower end of the income
scale.  Finally, with regard to declines in teacher salaries relative to the per capita GNP, the table
shows that  at all stages  of economic development,  it is the single most  important source of
increase  in resources  for primary  education, contributing between  half and  two-thirds  of the
richer country's  advantage.  At the lower end of the income scale, its contribution is especially
large, reflecting the typical pattern  of precipitous  decline in teacher pay  relative to per capita
GNP as country incomes rise from low levels.
How do countries deploy the extra resources that become  available for primary
education in the process of economic development?  Table 8 shows how they  are allocated to
expand coverage and reduce pupil-teacher ratios in the same pairs of rich and poor countries as
above.  In only the lowest income group does quantitative expansion receive more emphasis than
quality improvement in education as countries' per capita GNP levels rise.  When incomes rise
from $200 per capita to $400, 53 percent of the increase in public resources for education is used
to expand coverage, raising primary school enrollment rates from 47 percent to 57 percent.  At
all  subsequent  stages  of  economic  development,  however,  a  declining  share  of  the  extra
resources is used in this way, even though coverage remains far from universal.  By the time the
enrollment rate reaches about 75 percent, nearly two-thirds of the gain in resources that become
available for primary  education in  the  course  of economic development  are  directed toward
lowering pupil-teacher ratios.-32 -
Table  8: Comparing  the deployment  of increased  resources  for primary  education  in pairs of countries
at selected  levels of per capita GNP, 1993
Per capita GNP ($)  Primary schooling in Country A  Resource  Percentage allocation of country B's extra
availability  in  resources for primary education availability in  Reuto  in
Enrollment rate  Pupil-teacher  B relative to  Expansion  Reducton  Tn
Country A  Country B  .00  rai  tainA  ofcvrg  pupil-teacher  Total (%)  ratio  that in A aI  of coverage  ratio
200  400  47.0  44.0  1.43  52.7  47.3  100%
400  800  56.7  37.2  1.39  47.0  53.0  100 %
800  1,500  66.1  31.3  1.32  42.4  57.6  100 %
1,500  3,000  74.3  26.7  1.32  39.2  60.8  100 %
3,000  10,000  82.7  22.6  1.46  35.9  64.1  100 %
Source:  authors'  calculation  based  on data in  table 5.
a/ This column  corresponds  to the right-hand-side  of equation  (3) and is  the product  of country  B's advantage  over  A in coverage  and
in the pupil-teacher  ratio. Note that the data are close  to the figures  in column  3 of table  2.5, which correspond  to the left-hand-side
of equation  (3).
Comparing resource availability and deployment in 1993 and 1975.  Do the same
patterns in resource availability and deployment characterize richer and poorer countries in an
early period?  To find out, we compared the same pairs of countries presented above, using data
for 1975.  We chose this year because it is sufficiently far back to offer a long-term perspective
and  because data  are  still  available for  a  sufficiently large  number  of countries  on  the key
indicators.
The results  pertaining to  resource availability  appear  in figure  11, which  also
includes the data for 1993 as a reference.31 The pattern in 1975 is comparable to that in the later
year in that the resources for primary education are always more plentiful in the richer country in
each pair.  For all income pairs except the first ($200 and $400), the advantage in  1993 slightly
exceeds that in 1975.
31  Another  way  to view  the differences  between  1995  and 1993  is to compare  countries  at the same  level  of per capita  GNP  in  the two
years;  the  results  appear  in  appendix  A and confirm  the pattems  discussed  here.-33 -
Figure 11: Advantage in resource availability for primary education in a richer country (B) relative
to that in a poorer country (A), 1975 and 1993
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As  before  the  richer  country  in  each  pair  derives  its  advantage  in  resource
availability from three sources: increased budget allocations, easing of the demographic burden,
and decline in teacher pay relative to the per capita GNP.  How does the relative contribution
from these sources differ between  1993 and  1975?  Figure  12 reveals similarities  as well as
differences.  The most apparent similarity is the relatively stable and modest share contributed by
increased budgetary allocations for primary education in both years, accounting for no more than
20 percent at any income level.  Another similarity is that in both years, the decline in teacher
pay relative to per capita GNP made the largest contribution-except  in the highest income pair
for 1975-accounting  for between half and three-quarters of the increased resource availability
for primary education in the richer country.
What is different between  1975 and  1993 relates to the pairs  of countries at the
two ends of the income scale.  In the low income pair-countries  at $200 and $400 in per capita
GNP-easing  of the demographic burden contributes  only  1.7 percent to  the richer  country's
resource advantage in 1975, compared with 16.2 percent in 1993.  The result reflects the fact that
in the earlier year, the share of the school-aged children in the population was nearly the same at
both levels of per capita GNP, around 25 percent.  In the later year, however, it was 23.0 percent
in the poorer country compared with 21.6 percent in the richer country.  In both countries, the
decline in teacher pay relative to the per  capita GNP contributed 79 percent  in  1975 and  63
percent in 1993 to the richer country's advantage in resource availability.- 34-
Figure 12: Contribution of various factors to the resource advantage enjoyed by richer countries
(B) relative to poorer ones (A) in 1975 and 1993
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At the high end of the income range, the two countries being compared-with  a
per capita GNP of $3,000 and $ 10,000 respectively-also  show striking differences in the impact
of the easing of the demographic burden on the richer country's  advantage.  In 1975, this factor
accounted for 62 percent of the richer country's resource advantage, compared with 32 percent in
1993.  The pattern in  1975 is the only  instance where the easing of the demographic burden
contributes more to a richer country's resource advantage than the decline in teacher pay relative
to the per capita GNP.
The contrast between the patterns in the sets of countries at the extreme ends of
the income spectrum in 1975 and. 1993 illustrates the impact of demographic transition over the
past few decades.  In the earlier year, the demographic transition occurred at higher levels of per
capita  GNP, but  by  1993, the phenomenon  had  spread to  even the lowest  income countries.
Correspondingly,  in  1993 the  easing  of  demographic  pressures  began  making  a  significant
contribution to the richer country's  advantage in resource availability for primary education at all
stages of economic development, whereas in 1975 did so only at the more advanced stages.
We turn  now to  compare  patterns  in  the allocation  of the resource  advantage
enjoyed by the richer country in each income pair.  As before, our accounting framework allows-35-
us to  examine the issue in terms of the relative share of the resources  directed to  expanding
coverage or reducing the pupil-teacher  ratio. Figure 13 suggests the following broad difference
between 1975 and 1993: countries generally placed greater emphasis on expanding coverage in
the earlier year.  In the lowest income pair, for example, 81.0 percent of the resource advantage
enjoyed by the richer  country (i.e. the one  at $400 in per  capita  GNP) was used to  expand
enrollments in  1975, compared with  only  52.7 percent in  1993.  In both years, however, the
common feature is that countries begin to shift the emphasis toward reducing the pupil-teacher
ratio at all subsequent stages of income growth.  In each pair of countries, its share of the richer
country's  resource advantage exceeds  50 percent  as incomes  rise beyond  $400 in  1993, and
beyond $1,500 in 1975.
Figure  13: Resource  allocation  to expand coverage  and reduce  pupil-teacher  ratios in richer
countries  (B) relative  to poorer  ones (A) in 1975 and 1993
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Given  that  the  enrollment  rate  has  an  upper  bound  of  100 percent,  it is  not
surprising that as countries grow rich and coverage expands, they allocate a declining share of
the  incremental resources  for  the  sector to  expand  coverage.  Yet  when  we  plot  the  share
allocated to expand coverage against the enrollment rate of the poorer  country in each pair, the
shift in emphasis away from the expansion of coverage occurs well before universal coverage is
achieved,  as  figure  14  shows  (for  completeness,  the  figure  shows  on  the  right  axis,  the-36-
complementary  percentage  used to reduce the pupil-teacher  ratio).  In 1993, for example, at an
initial enrollment rate of 60 percent in primary education, only about 40 percent of any extra
resources  that materialize  in the process of economic  development  are used to expand coverage.
What is especially  interesting  is that the shift away from coverage  occurs at much lower levels of
initial coverage in the later year.  At an enrollment  rate of 50 percent, for example, about 75
percent of the extra resources is used to expand coverage in  1975, compared with only 50
percent in 1993.
Figure 14: Relative  emphasis  on expansion  of coverage  and reduction  of pupil-teacher  ratio  at
various levels  of initial  enrollment  ratios, 1975  and 1993
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3.4 Summary  of structural  differences  in education  between  rich and poor countries
In the foregoing discussion we have decomposed  the differences in education
between  rich and poor countries,  using an accounting  identity involving  terms pertaining  to the
availability  of resources for education  on one hand, and the deployment  of those resources  on the
other.
When pairs of countries at contiguous income levels are compared, the richer
country  in each pair invariably  enjoys a substantial  resource advantage;  a country at $3,000  in
per capita GNP, for example, has more than 4 times the resources per school-aged  child of a
country at $200.  The advantage  arises from three sources: bigger budget allocations, lighter
demographic  burdens;  and smaller  teacher salaries  relative to the per capita GNP. The resource
advantage  of richer countries  allows  them to expand  coverage  and lower  teacher-pupil  ratios.-37 -
Looking  more  closely  at  primary  education,  we  found  that  at  all  stages  of
economic growth, differences in budget allocations generally make only a modest contribution to
richer countries' resource advantage, while the decline in teacher pay relative to the per capita
GNP makes the biggest contribution, accounting for between 56 and 68 percent of the advantage.
The contribution of the easing of the demographic burden  shows dramatic changes over time,
ranging between  17 and  32 percent  in  1993 across the  income  spectrum represented  in our
exercise (from $200 to $10,000), and between  1.7 and 62 percent in  1975.  The much wider
range in 1975 is consistent with the fact that the transition  to lower fertility rates occurred at
higher income levels in 1975 than in 1993.
With their resource advantage, richer countries have the option of emphasizing an
expansion of coverage  or a  reduction  in the pupil-teacher  ratio.  They have emphasized the
former only at the earliest stages of economic growth, when incomes rise from $200 to $400 in
1993 and from $200 to about $1,500 in 1975.  At all subsequent levels of income growth, the
emphasis shifted to lowering the pupil-teacher ratio.  Noteworthy  is that the shift occurred in
contexts where coverage in primary education is still not yet universal.
4. What  are the policy  issues?
Two kinds of policy issues arise from the foregoing analysis.  The first relates to
the long-term shift in favor of lowering pupil-teacher ratios that we have documented: to what
extent does it represent an efficient path for the development of primary education in developing
countries, particularly in the poorest countries where a significant share of children still have no
access to primary education?  The second issue relates to the fact that the patterns refer to the
average for countries  at each stage  of economic development:  how much scope is  there  for
deviation from the average pattern, and what difference in educational outcomes does it make?
4.1 Expansion of coverage versus lowering pupil-teacher ratios
In  all  countries  improving  access  and  student learning  are  key  objectives  of
educational policies.  The accelerated decline in pupil-teacher ratios over the past two decades
suggests that policy  makers have  succumbed to  the  hope that  lowering this  indicator  would
translate into gains  in student learning.  Yet there  is persistent  and widespread evidence that
simply lowering pupil-teacher ratios does not generally produce the desired gains in learning. 32
While  recent  evidence  from  a  randomized  experiment  in  the  United  States  do  suggest  a
32 See, for example,  Hanushek, E. A.(1995) "Interpreting recent research on schooling in developing countries." World Bank Research
Observer 10(2):  227-46.-38 -
connection between  smaller  classes  and  achievement 33,  the  finding has  limited  relevance  in
developing countries for several reasons.  Most importantly, the experiment involves reducing
class size from a much smaller initial level than is typical in the average low-income country.
Gains in student learning  also  depends on  changes in  teaching  and learning practices-from
passive learning  by  students listening  to  a  teacher talking  in  front of  the class,  to hands-on
learning-that  may be difficult to implement in systems without adequate support and resources
for teacher training and classroom experimentation.
Evidence from the cross-country data used in the present study support the claim
that lowering the pupil-teacher ratios has few payoffs (if any) in student learning in the typical
context of developing countries.  In table 9 we regressed achievement scores on international
mathematics and science tests among 9-14 year-old children against selected regressors. 34 The
results strongly suggest that variation in pupil-teacher ratios in the sample range has no impact
on  student  achievement;  in  all  three  regression  models,  the  coefficient  on  the  indicator  is
statistically not different from zero.  Instead, the educational attainment of adults in the country
and the adult literacy rate show strong and positive impact.  The estimates indicate that a one-
year rise  in adults'  average  school attainment raises a country's  performance on international
mathematics and science tests by 0.84 points  (or 0.17 of a standard deviation from the sample
mean), and that a one percentage point advantage in the adult literacy rate raises test scores by
0.30 points (or 0.06 of a standard deviation from the sample mean).
Table 9: Regression estimates of the correlates of scores on international mathematics and
science tests, 1990s
. ~~1.11-  - Ln (per capita GNP, 1993)  (1.5)
Adults' average years of school attainment a/  0.84**
______________(2.2)
Adult literacy rate (%)  0_(3.3)0***
Pupil-teacher ratio in primary education  -0.11  (011  (0.7)
Constant  40.6  43.7  17.7
Number of countries  35  33  34
R  2  0.19  0.30  0.38
Source:  the estimates  are based  on country  data  on achievement  from  Lee and Barro 1997  (op. cit.);  and on the other
variables  from  the IREDU  database.
33 See Krueger,  Alan B. (1997)  "Experimental  estimates  of education  production  functions,"  National  Bureau  of Economic  Research
Working  Paper  # 6051,  Cambridge,  Mass.
34 See  section  2.3  above  for a description  of the data  used  in this analysis.-39-
That adults'  educational  capital  affect  children's  learning  achievement should
hardly be surprising.  The link arises not just  because educated parents provide more effective
support for a child's education, but also because in more literate societies, children are exposed
to  many  learning  opportunities  in  daily  living-through  newspapers  and  other  printed
materials-that  reinforce what is taught in the classroom.  The finding argues not so much for
massive investment in adult literacy programs, as for a dedicated and sustained effort to expand
coverage so that each child has the opportunity to  enter school and complete at least primary
schooling.  Especially in countries where substantial numbers of children still do not enroll and
where too many of those who enroll drop out before finishing the cycle, a re-orientation toward
expanding  coverage  and  away  from  reducing  the  pupil-teacher  ratio,  requires  serious
consideration by policy makers.
Where budgets  for education are limited, these choices present a  stark tradeoff
that is probably more efficient to resolve in favor of expanding coverage.  This does not mean
there is no place for policies to rationalize the distribution of teachers within the system; such
policies are clearly relevant where wide disparities in pupil-teacher ratios exist (e.g. across urban
and  rural areas and across rich  and  poor neighborhoods).  However, the  appropriate way  to
address them is to redistribute resources across schools, rather than to reduce the overall pupil-
teacher ratio at the expense of expanding coverage in the system as a whole.
As a  final  observation it  is of  interest to  take note  of the  choices that  Korea
(whose education system is recognized as arnong the best in the world today) made with regard
to the pupil-teacher ratio as the country developed economically. 35 Between 1950 and  1970, as
the per capita GNP rose from $500 to $1,000, this indicator was maintained at the astonishingly
high level of nearly 60 pupils per teacher; at the same time, primary education expanded to reach
universal coverage in the 1  960s.  It was only at subsequent stages of income growth that the ratio
was allowed to decline, reaching 30 only after the per  capita GNP had risen to  $8,000 (in the
early 1990s).  Although we have no information on student learning in Korea in the 1950s and
1960s we do know that in the 1980s and  1990s, the average Korean pupil achieved among the
highest scores on international  science and mathematics tests, despite the country's  generally
higher pupil-teacher ratio relative to other countries.  Korea's experience suggests that a strategy
of emphasizing expansion of coverage over lowering of the pupil-teacher  does not necessarily
harm student learning in the long run; on the contrary, by broadening the base of human capital
development, it may have contributed to the outstanding achievement of its young people today.
3  See Alain Mingat (1988), "The  strategy used by high-performing Asian economies in education: some lessons for developing
countries,"  World Development 26(4): 695-715.-40 -
4.2 The scope for and consequences of policy choice within countries
We turn now to examine deviations from the average patterns in the structure of
progress in education, focussing on the diversity across countries in terms of budget allocations
for  education,  demographic pressures  and  labor market  conditions  for  teachers,  as  well  as
education outcomes as reflected in  coverage and pupil-teacher ratios.  We use examples from
selected low-income countries where the scope for policy intervention appears to be particularly
clear.
Consider Laos and Niger which had a similar per capita GNP in 1993-$280  and
$270, respectively.  The resources available per school-aged child for primary education in Laos
were 4.3 times as high as that in Niger, however.  What is the source of this enormous gap?  The
latter country admittedly faced a heavier demographic burden,  with the school-age population
representing 24 percent of the total population rather than only 21 percent.  But this factor by
itself would have implied an advantage for Laos of only 1.17 times.  Indeed the advantage should
have been completely reversed by the fact that in Laos public spending  on primary education
was only 0.64 times as high as in Niger.  Instead the advantage enjoyed by Laos widens to a
startling 4.3 times.  The reason is that the cost of teachers is much smaller in Laos, with salaries
averaging  1.7 times  the per capita GNP,  compared with  9.7 times  in Niger.  Because of its
resource advantage,  Laos  achieved more than  twice Niger's  coverage  in  primary  education,
enrolling 53 of the primary school age population. instead of only 20 percent.  In both countries,
pupil-teacher ratios were comparable at about 31-34 pupils per teacher.
Niger  allocated  more  public  spending  for  primary  education  than  Laos,  but
achieved less in  coverage,  because teacher  salaries were  so high.  High  teacher  salaries are
indeed a common feature of the education sector in Francophone African countries.  In countries
where budget allocations for primary education are not as favorable as in Niger, the result has
been lower coverage as well as severe pressures on classroom conditions in the form of very high
pupil-teacher ratios.  Compare, for example, Chad and Nepal-countries  with per capita GNP of
around $200 in  1993.  Public spending on primary education in Chad was only 80 percent as
high as than in Nepal in 1993, and teacher salaries were  1.72 times as high.  Both factors put
Chad at a resource disadvantage, which translated into smaller coverage and higher pupil-teacher
ratios: Chad  enrolled  only 25 percent  of its  primary  school-age children,  compared with  54
percent in Nepal; and its education system had an average of 61 pupils per teacher, compared
with 39 in Nepal.-41-
The contrast  between  Chad and Nepal, and between  Laos and Niger highlights  the
fact that poverty is not the only factor that hampers educational development. Demographic
pressures  tend to be more burdensome  in poor countries,  increasing  the difficulty  of expanding
coverage and improving the quality of the learning environment. Yet among poor countries,
policies  that affect budget allocations  to education  and especially  policies  that influence  teacher
salaries  do vary and account  for widely  different  paths of educational  development.
Cross country comparisons as well as within country evidence point to possible
directions  for policy development.  In Niger, the scope  for further  increases  in budget allocations
for primary education  is probably more limited  than in Chad, given that current spending  levels
are already relatively high.  In both countries, as in the majority of Francophone African
countries,  substantial  headway depends on the future evolution  of teacher salaries. In many of
these countries,  teacher salaries have declined  in real terms (i.e. relative to the per capita GNP)
between 1980  and 1993,  reflecting  the impact  of general price inflation  and structural  adjustment
policies 36. But several observations  among countries in the region indicate that much deeper
declines  are probably  feasible:
(a)  Salaries  in private schools  are much lower  than in public schools,  by as much as 40
percent  or more;
(b)  Excess demand  for public  sector teaching  jobs, even when the jobs are offered at much
lower salaries than those received by incumbents. In Burkina Faso, the government
created a  new  category of  lesser-qualified teachers-"instituteur  adjoints" which
require only a lower secondary  school certificate. It received 18,000 applications  for
the 800 positions, many from people with much more education  than was required.
Similarly in  Senegal, the government hired "volontaires" at one third the salary of
incumbent  teachers, and even so received  28 applications  for each available  job in this
category.
(c)  Expansion of  community schools where teachers are  hired  directly by  the  local
community. Teachers  typically  receive  a fraction  of the pay of public school teachers
and none of the non-pecuniary  benefits  of public sector  employment. Examples  include
the "ecoles  de base" in Mali  and the "ecoles spontan6es"  in Chad.
36 See Mingat, Alain (forthcoming 1999) "Assessing priorities for education policy in the Sahel from a comparative perspective,"
Comparative Education.-42 -
Hiring  lesser  qualified teachers  and encouraging  cheaper  types  of schools  are
obviously feasible in many of the countries where public sector teacher pay is relatively high.  A
direct consequence would be to allow coverage to expand; at the same time the policy does not
necessarily compromise student learning.  A recent evaluation suggests that students in Mali's
"ecoles de base" in fact outperform their counterparts in regular public schools; and that students
taught by the "volontaires" in Senegal outperform pupils taught by the more qualified teachers. 37
Thus,  although  gains  in  coverage  and  improvement  in  classroom  conditions
generally materialize as part of the process of economic development, countries achieve better or
worse results than other countries at comparable levels of economic development according to
the policies they adopt, particularly  with respect to budget priorities, teacher salaries, and the
relative emphasis on expansion of coverage and decreases in pupil-teacher ratios.
5. Conclusion
In this study we have used aggregate data to explore the relation between country
wealth  and  various  aspects of  educational  development;  examine  the underlying  sources  of
differences in  education among rich and poor  countries; and  raise questions about promising
directions for policy  development  in  the  sector, particularly  in  the context  of  lower  income
countries. As countries become richer, they generally spend more per pupil, expand coverage of
the  school-aged population,  lower  the  pupil  teacher  ratio,  achieve  improvements  in  student
learning, enhance the efficiency  of student flow patterns  and  sector operations,  and improve
equity in access to schooling and the distribution  of public spending on education.  On some
dimensions,  such  as  coverage,  access  and  per  pupil  spending,  the  improvement  follows  a
relatively steep rise with per capita GNP, whereas on other indicators, such as student learning,
the rise is less steep, and on yet other indicators, such as the share of enrollments in private
schools, there is hardly any relationship to the per capita GNP.
An appealing explanation for the generally superior outcomes in richer countries
is that they have more resources to support well-functioning and effective systems of education.
Indeed richer countries have more resources for education per school-aged child.  But bigger
budget  allocations  account  for  a  modest  share  of  the  advantage,  since public  spending  on
education relative  to  the GNP rises only  modestly  as incomes  grow.  Focussing on  primary
37 Fomba, M.  (1996) "L'enseignment primaire au Mali: mode de financement et acquisition des eleves," PhD dissertation,  Uinversite
de Bourgogne,  Dijon, France.-43  -
education for which more detailed analysis was feasible, we found that this factor contributed no
more than 20 percent of a richer countries'  resource advantage as incomes rise from  $200 to
$400 (in 1993 prices), and no more than 14 percent of the advantage at all subsequent stages of
income growth up to $10,000.  Easing of the demographic burden makes a bigger difference, its
contribution ranging between 17 and 32 percent of richer countries'  advantage as incomes rise
from $200 to $10,000.  At all stages of economic development, by far the most important source
of  increased  public  spending  available  per  school-aged  child  in  the  richer  countries  is  the
dramatic decline  in  teacher  salaries  relative  to  the per  capita  GNP  as  countries  grow rich,
accounting for as much as two-thirds of the resource advantage in the richer country at some
stages of income growth.  As the resources  available per  school-aged child materializes with
income growth, countries are able to expand coverage and improve schooling conditions via a
reduction  in the pupil-teacher  ratio.  They initially  allocate more of the resources  to expand
coverage,  but  the  emphasis  quickly  shifts  in  favor  of  lowering the  pupil-teacher  ratio  even
though  a substantial share of the primary school-aged population remains out of school.  This
trend toward lower pupil-teacher ratios was stronger in the 1990s than in the 1970s.
Is the shift toward  smaller pupil-teacher ratios an efficient way to use the extra
resources that become available for education in the course of economic growth?  According to
the  cross-country  evidence in  the  present  study  as well  as findings  reported  in  the broader
literature  the  answer  is  probably  in  the  negative,  particularly  in  the  context  of  the poorer
countries.  One reason is that over  the typical range of the pupil-teacher  ratio in  developing
country contexts, a reduction in the variable has little impact on student learning.  Another is that
reducing the pupil-teacher ratio implies slower progress in expanding educational coverage.  The
long run result is lower levels of educational attainment among tomorrow's  adults, which in turn
is likely to diminish learning achievement among tomorrow's children.
Besides the systematic differences in education associated with country wealth,
substantial  diversity  is  also  evident  among  countries  at  comparable  levels  of  economic
development.  In all low income countries, for example, high teacher salaries relative to the per
capita  GNP reduce the scope  for expanding  educational  coverage, but  the salaries are much
higher in African countries than in comparable countries in other regions, leading to wide gaps in
coverage and well as in pupil-teacher ratios.  Where a country deviates substantially from the
income-related structural patterns, a likely reason is that it has made different policy choices than
other  countries.  The  scope  for  choice  is  indeed wide,  ranging  from  the  overall  pattern  of
resource allocation in education, to how education services are organized and delivered.  Setting
aside the impact of country wealth, policy choices, particularly with regard to  teacher salaries-44 -
and  the  tradeoff  between  coverage  and  reductions  in  pupil-teacher  ratios,  can and  do have
significant influence on the path of educational development in developing countries.-45 -
Appendix A
Comparing Education in Rich and Poor Countries in 1975 and 1993
In section 3.3 in the text we compared richer countries' advantage in education in
1975 and 1993 by looking at pairs of countries at contiguous income levels in each year.  Another
way to examine the data is to compare pairs of countries--one from each year--at the same level of
per capita GNP (in constant dollar terms).  The patterns that emerge (summarized in the three
graphs below)  are  consistent with  those  discussed in  the  text.  At  each  stage of  economic
development, more public resources are available for primary education in the later than earlier
year.  Larger budget allocations account for little of the advantage in the later year, but differences
in  demographic burdens  and  teacher  pay  relative  to  the  per  capita  GNP  make  significant
contributions. A country at $800 in per capita GNP in 1993, for example, derives nearly 40 percent
of  its  resource advantage relative to  its  1975 counterpart from the  fact  that  its  school aged
population was only 20.2 percent of the total population compared with 24.1 percent in the earlier
year.  Declines in relative teacher pay make the  largest contribution, however, accounting for
between 80 and 60 percent of the resource advantage in the latter year.  With regard to how the
resource advantage is used, the pattern confirms what we have already seen above: in the poorest
countries, the overriding emphasis has been on  expansion of coverage, but  this  focus quickly
switches in favor of reducing the pupil-teacher ratios once the per capita incomes exceeds $800.
Figure A.1:  Resource  availability  for primary  education  in 1993 and 1975
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Figure A.2: Sources of the resource advantage for primary education in 1993 relative to that in 1975
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Figure A.3: Deployment of the resource advantage for primary education in 1993 relative to that in 1975
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